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Elster: Who is the Parent in Cloning?

WHO IS TIE PARENT IN CLONING?
Nanette Elster*
In July 1996, a sheep named Dolly was born in Scotland. What
makes Dolly's birth noteworthy is that she is the result of the first successful cloning attempt using the nucleus of an adult cell.' The technique that led to Dolly's birth involved transferring the nucleus of a
mammary cellfrom an adultsheep to the enucleated egg cell of an unrelated sheep with gestation occurring in a third sheep.2 The possibility of
applying this technique to human reproduction raised concerns worldwide with several countries moving for immediate bans on human
cloning.3
In the United States, PresidentClinton requested that the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission ("NBAC"), a multidisciplinary group
composed of scientists, lawyers, educators, theologians, and ethicists
study the implications of cloning and issue recommendations.4 The
Commission consulted other scientists, ethicists, theologians, lawyers,
and citizens with interests in this advancing technology and concluded
that, "at this time it is morally unacceptablefor anyone in the public or
private sector, whether in a research or clinical setting, to attempt to

* J.D., M.P.H. The Author would like to thank Lori Andrews for her continual guidance
and encouragement, and Michelle Hibbert for her insight and valuable assistance.
1. See .Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derivedfrom Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells,
385 NATURE 810, 812 (1997); Sharon Begley, Little Lamb, Who Made Thee?, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
10, 1997, at 53, 53.
2. See Michael Specter with Gina Kolata, After Decades of Missteps, How Cloning Succeeded, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at Al.
3. See, e.g., Tim Radford, German Fury Over Cloning, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 28,
1997, at 10; China's Scientists Back Laws to Control Cloning (Feb. 28, 1997)
<http:/lwww.foxnews.comlscitechlwireslt_0228_4.sml>; ChiracAsks Review of Ethics Laws After
Sheep Clone (Feb. 28, 1997) <http:lwww.foxnews.comlscitechlwires/t_0228_5.sml>; Portugal
Prepares Bill to Ban Cloning Humans (Feb. 28, 1997) <http://www.foxnews.com
/scitech/wires/t_0228_17.sml>.
4. See 1 NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIorHIcs ADVISORY COMMISSION 3 (1997).
5. See idL at 9.
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create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfercloning. ,6
This Article was included in a largerwork preparedat the request
of and submitted to the Commission by, law professor Lori B. Andrews.
Cloning through nuclear transfer will change the way we create and
define families. This Article explores how existing laws relating to parentage, surrogacy, egg donation, and artificialinsemination may apply
in the cloning context to clarify the parent-childrelationship established
through cloning.
I.

INTRODUCTION

It has been two years since the announcement of Dolly's birth. The
images of science fiction which it conjured are beginning to fade as the
possibility of cloning becomes more of a reality. During the intervening
years since Dolly's birth, many noteworthy advances have been made in
cloning technology, such as the cloning of mice by a team led by Dr.
Ryuzo Yanagimachi at the University of Hawaii,7 and the alleged creation of a four-cell human embryo by South Korean scientists.8 Despite
the rapid progress of science, many of the legal, ethical, and social
questions emanating from cloning remain unanswered. Among the
questions necessitating a response is who is the legal parent of a clone?
Even if a ban on cloning is imposed, the law must still consider
what to do if cloning does happen. After all, just because an activity is
prohibited by law does not mean that no one will engage in that activity-murder is a case in point. Generally, the law provides an after-thefact remedy in the form of punishment and/or compensation, neither of
which appropriately or adequately addresses the needs of a clone who
above all else will be a child. Even if only one child is created in this
way, determining who has legal and social responsibility for that child
is imperative.

I1. LAWS DEFINING THE ROLE OF PARENT
Traditionally, "family" referred to the nuclear family-a household
consisting of a husband, wife, and their children. This traditional view

6. Idat 104.
7. See Michael D. Lemonick, Dolly, You're History, TIME, Aug. 3, 1998, at 64, 64. Although Dr. Yanagimachi was the lab director at the lab where the alleged cloning took place, the
real impetus behind the cloning was a postdoctoral student named Teruhiko Wakayama. See id.
8. See Sheryl WuDunn, South Korean Scientists Say They Cloned a Human Cell, N.Y.

TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1998, at A12. The team halted the experiment before implanting the embryo,
leaving open the question of whether it would have developed into a fetus. See id.
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of family, though, is continually being challenged. Divorce, same-sex
couples, and single parenthood create family structures far different
from the traditional concept of family. Additionally, the use of assisted
reproductive technologies, including the use of gamete or embryo donors, as well as surrogates, leads to familial configurations not contemplated just a few decades ago.
Are these recent family structures and methods of family building
any less valuable than the traditional nuclear family created through
coital reproduction? This question has not been fully answered-in part,
because the answer requires society to consider what values "family"
represents, and what it means to be a parent. Using the nuclear family as
a model, the law very clearly defines rights and obligations based on
one's status as a parent.
As described by one commentator:
Parents have the right to custody of their child; to discipline the child;
and to make decisions about education, medical treatment, and religious upbringing. Parents assign the child a name. They have a right to
the child's earnings and services. They decide where the child shall
live. Parents have a right to information gathered by others about the
child and may exclude others from that information. They may speak
for the child and may assert or waive the child's rights. Parents have
the right to determine who may visit the child and to place the child in
another's care.
... Parents must care for their child, support him financially, see to
his education, and provide him proper medical care.'
These rights and obligations become less clear when the roles of
mother and father are not as obvious as when a couple produces a child
through coital reproduction. Methods of collaborative reproduction necessitate reconsidering what it means to be a parent. Is parenthood defined by biology, genetics, intention, or rearing? These types of questions will need to be answered when sorting out the rights and
responsibilities of the potential parents if an individual is cloned.
Current state laws addressing parentage, including paternity acts,
surrogacy statutes, and egg donation statutes are not broad enough to
address the multitude of parentage issues raised by the process of cloning through nuclear transfer. Additionally, those few states which have
9. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Needfor Legal
Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879, 884-85
(1984) (footnotes omitted); accord Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in
the Context of CollaborativeReproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 329, 390-91 (1995) (quoting
Bartlett).
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enacted cloning legislation ban the process without contemplating the
issue of parentage if the law is broken and, in fact, a child is born.1°
The process of cloning will result in a child having genetic material
from as many as four individuals: the person from whom the cell nucleus was derived, that individual's biological parents, and the woman
contributing the enucleated egg cell, which contains a small fraction of
mitochondrial deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA"). In addition, if the egg
with the transferred nucleic material is implanted in a surrogate gestational mother, the child will have two other potential parents-the gestator, and if she is married, her husband. The latter will have rights-even
though he has no biological connection to the child-based on the
common law presumption that if a woman gives birth within marriage,
her husband is the child's legal father. Or, in some states, specific
statutes provide that the surrogate and her husband are the legal parents
of a child she has gestated regardless of their genetic contribution."
There may also be intended rearing parents unrelated to the individual
who is cloned, such as when the cloned individual is deceased or a celebrity.
With so many contributors-biologic, genetic, and socialdetermining who shall assume the parental rights and obligations of the
resulting child is very difficult, not only from a legal standpoint, but
also from scientific, psychological, and sociological perspectives. In the
cloning scenario, it is unclear which of the contributors is responsible
for raising and supporting the resulting child. If parenthood is not clarified, there may be situations in which either the state will bear the responsibility, or the child will be caught in a legally complicated and
protracted custody battle. 3
In attempting to determine the parentage of a clone, it is going to
be necessary to not only consider states' paternity laws, but also any
state laws that address parentage in the context of egg donation and sur10. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16004, 16105, 2260.5 (West Supp. 1998); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24185, 24187 (West Supp. 1998); 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 108; 1998
Mich. Pub. Acts 109; 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts 110; 1998 Mich. Pub. Acts I11; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2316.4-1 to -4 (1999).

11. This presumption comes from the common law of England, and today it exists in nearly
every state, but in a rebuttable form. See Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance
Consequences of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1091, 1097 (1997).
12. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a) (1995).

13. An example of such a legally complicated custody battle in the surrogate mother context
is the now famous Baby M case. See generally In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (holding
that the surrogate contract conflicted with state law and public policy, and that it was in the best
interest of the child to award custody to the natural father and his wife, while granting visitation
rights to the natural mother).
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rogacy. There are two types of surrogacy-traditional and gestational.
Traditional surrogacy involves a woman agreeing to be inseminated
with sperm from the intended father (or a donor), carrying the resulting
child to term and relinquishing all parental rights to the child to the intended father and his wife if he is married. In that situation, the surrogate is providing the egg, which includes mitochondrial DNA and nucleic DNA, and is gestating the fetus. Gestational surrogacy typically
involves a woman agreeing to carry an embryo created through in vitro
fertilization of the egg and sperm of the intended parents or a donated
egg and/or sperm and relinquishing the child to the intended parents.
The distinction between the two forms of surrogacy is that with gestational surrogacy, the woman who carries the child to term contributes no
genetic material. Currently, at least thirty-four states have laws address-

ing artificial insemination by donor, 4 but only five states have laws
dealing specifically with parentage in egg donation. 5 While twenty
states and the District of Columbia have laws addressing surrogacy, 6
14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (Lexis 1998); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-50103) (West 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-201 to -202 (Miechie 1998);
CAL. FArl. CODE §§ 7005, 7613 (West 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (vest Supp.
1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-771 to -779 (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (Vest
1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-5401 to -5408 (1998); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 40/3 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -29 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 381114 (1993 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (1991); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 1994); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824(6) (West 1992 &
Supp. 1998); MN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 1996);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061 (Michie 1998); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-13:10 to -B:12 (1994 & Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West
1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (Michie 1978); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1988);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 to -04 (1997); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-53, 555
(West 1998); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 109.239-.247 & 677.355-.370 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3306 (1996); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.101 (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie
1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West 1997); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West 1997);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-103 (Michie 1997); see also Lori B. Andrews & Nanette R. Elster, Legal
Issues in FertilityManagement, in INFERTILITY IN THE MALE 476, 477 (Larry I.Lipshultz & Stuart
S. Howards eds., 3rd ed. 1997) (charting the states that have laws addressing artifical insemination).
15. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 555; TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.102; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158.
16. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (Vest 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201;
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-401 to -402 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(i) (West Supp. 1999); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 742.15-.16 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1 to -3 (vest
1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 710.11 (West 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie
1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAvS ANN. §§ 722.851-.863
(vest 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (Michie
1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:16-B:30 (1994 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. DOM. RE.. LAW
§§ 121-24 (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
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17
only eight of those address the issue of parentage.

m11.

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION LAWS

Whether and how these laws might apply to cloning is a complex
matter. Under artificial insemination laws, if a man provides sperm for
the artificial insemination of a consenting woman and her consenting
husband, that couple, and not the sperm donor, are recognized as the legal parents of any child born as a result of the procedure.'8 Because
statutes specifically use the term "sperm" or "semen,"' 9 they arguably
do not influence the cloning situation in which a man provides DNA in
the form of nucleic material from a somatic cell rather than sperm.

IV. EGG DONATION LAWS
The egg donation laws are more likely to be applicable, even
though the egg being used in cloning has only mitochondrial DNA, not
nucleic DNA. In the five states having egg donation legislation, the donor is not considered to be the mother of the resulting child. Four of the
states' statutes specifically assert that the donor has no parental rights or
obligations with respect to the resulting child.2' The Texas statute likely
results in the same outcome, but it addresses the issue of legal parentage
only from the perspective of the intended parents. It reads, in part:
If a husband consents to provide sperm to fertilize a donor oocyte by
in vitro fertilization or other assisted reproductive techniques and the
wife consents to have a donor oocyte that has been fertilized with her
husband's sperm, pursuant to his consent, placed in her uterus, a resulthig child is the child of both of them.2'

102(46) (Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159 to -160;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210-.270; W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16 (1998); Wis. STAT. ANN,
§ 69.14(h) (West 1990); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-410(d) (deeming the woman who gives birth to
the child as the mother for purposes of birth registration).
17. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B)-(C); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)-(c);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16; NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168B:23, B:25; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-

158(D).
18. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-774 to -775; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
40/3(b); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050.
19. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3; VASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050
20. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04(1);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 555; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(3).
21. TEx. FAM. CoDEANN. § 151.102(a) (West 1996).
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The language of this statute is significant in the cloning context,
because unlike the other four states' laws on egg donation, the Texas
statute does not state that the donor relinquishes all parental rights. This
law stresses that the intended parents would only be the legal parents if
the donated egg is fertilized with the husband's sperm. So, this would
not be broad enough to rule out the donor of the enucleated egg as a
potential parent in the cloning scenario. The law leaves unanswered the
question of the donor's rights and obligations if the egg is not fertilized
with the recipient's husband's sperm, as would be the case with cloning.
One might argue that if a donated egg is enucleated and a nucleus transferred to it, the egg donor may not only have parental rights to a resulting child, but also parental obligations such as support.
V.

SURROGACY LAWS

The surrogate mother laws also figure into the analysis. Although
eight states do have statutory presumptions regarding parentage determinations in surrogacy,22 the states differ over whether the surrogate and
her husband are presumed to be the parents or whether the biological
father and his wife are presumed to be the parents. Laws in Arizona,
North Dakota, and Utah presume that the surrogate and her husband are
the legal parents of the child,' whereas laws in Arkansas, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia presume that the genetic father and
his wife are the legal parents of the child.24 Of the eight states, only Arkansas's and Nevada's statutes do not apply to both traditional and gestational surrogacy. The Arkansas statute only covers traditional surrogacy.2 Because the presumption under the Arkansas statute is that the
intended father and his wife are the child's parents, 26 it is likely that the
same presumption would apply to gestational surrogacy where both of
the intended parents would have a genetic link to the child, but the issue
of parentage when donor gametes are used is not certain. The Nevada
statute, though, only applies to gestational surrogacy,27 leaving the de-

22. See sources cited supra note 17 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B)-(C) (West 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1418-05; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a) (1995).
24. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)-(c) (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742.16(6)-(7) (West Supp. 1999); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(2) (Michie 1993); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:23(IV), B:25 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(D)-(E).
25. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-10-201 (referring specifically to a child born of artifical insemination).
26. See id. § 9-10-201(b)-(c).
27. See NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(4).
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termination of parentage in a contested, traditional surrogacy arrangement unresolved.
Florida and New Hampshire impose specific age requirements
concerning who can participate in surrogacy arrangements. In Florida,
all participants must be eighteen or older,28 and in New Hampshire, all
participants must be twenty-one or older.29 Arguably, this requirement
may impede cloning a dying child, one suggested application of cloning.30 Since the dying child would be a participant in such an arrangement because his or her nucleic materials is used to create the embryo,
Florida's and New Hampshire's age requirements may render such an
arrangement illegal or void. North Dakota defines both a gestational
carrier and a surrogate as an "adult woman,"'" which presumably imposes an age requirement at least for the surrogate.
Another restriction found in the surrogacy statutes, which may be
even more limiting to cloning than an age requirement, is a requirement
that the intended parents be married. If marriage is a requirement, and
the statute applies to cloning situations, single individuals and same-sex
couples interested in cloning themselves would not be able to use the
mechanisms of the statute to assert parental rights as an intended parent.
Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Virginia specifically define intended parents as being married. 32 In addition, North Dakota uses the
terms husband and married woman rather than intended mother and intended father,33 which implies that participants need to be married in order for the statute to apply. Other requirements which may limit applicability to cloning include the requirements of the Virginia statute that
all participants must undergo a home study and meet applicable standards of fitness for adoptive parents.34
Three states' statutes have additional restrictions regarding recognition and approval of surrogacy contracts, which may further limit
their applicability to instances of cloning, especially by a single male. In
Florida, it must be determined by a licensed physician that "[t]he commissioning mother cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term; ...
28. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(l) (West 1997).
29. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17I).
30. See Lori B. Andrews, Human Cloning: Assessing the Ethical and Legal Quandaries,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., Feb. 13, 1998, at B4, B5 (including dying children among the list of candidates who have been considered for cloning).
31. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01 (1997).
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045(4)(b); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:l(VIE); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 1999).
33. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03.
34. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A)-(B).
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gestation will cause a risk [of harm] to the physical health of the commissioning mother; or ... will cause a risk [of harm] to the health of the
fetus."35 Both New Hampshire's and Virginia's statutes have similar requirements that the intended mother be unable to carry the child without
risk to herself or the fetus.36 Virginia's statute differs slightly from New
Hampshire's and Florida's in that it also takes into account risks to the
psychological health of the mother and resulting child. For a surrogacy
contract to be approved in Virginia, the intended mother must be
"infertile .... unable to bear a child, or ... unable to do so without unor to the physical or mental health of
reasonable risk to the unborn child
37
child.,
or
mother
the intended

VI. PARENTAGE ACTS AND CASE LAW
In states that do not have laws addressing a specific reproductive
technology, it is necessary to turn to a state's parentage act. Yet, even
that may not clearly resolve the question of who is the child's legal
mother. In California, for example, the parentage act would likely find
that both the woman who gestates a child and the woman who contributes her genetic material are the child's legal mothers. One section of
the act provides that "[b]etween a child and the natural mother, [the parent and child relationship] may be established by proof of her having
given birth to the child,"3 suggesting that the gestator is the mother.
Another section, though, allows for the use of a blood test to establish
maternity based on a genetic relationship, suggesting that the woman
who provided her genetic material is the mother."
The California Supreme Court was confronted with this conundrum in Johnson v. Calvert,4° a gestational surrogacy case in which the
surrogate asserted her parental rights to the child. 41 The court resolved
the case by looking to the parties' intent, which was memorialized in a
contract.42 The agreement clearly indicated that the intent of all the parties was for the man and woman whose sperm and egg formed the embryo to be the legal parents of the child. Based on this clearly expressed
intent, the court found that the mother of the child was the woman who
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(2)(a)-(c).
36. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17(11); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(8).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(8) (emphasis added).
38. CAL. FAi. CODE § 7610(a) (West 1994).
39. See id. § 7550,7551 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
40. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
41. See id. at 778.
42. See id. at 782.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:533

had contributed her genetic material.43 If a written contract had not expressed the parties' intent, the outcome of this case may have been different, as California does not have a statutory presumption of parentage
in the context of surrogacy. The result may also have differed if donor
eggs were used rather than the eggs of the intended mother. The court
would have had to decide whether gestation, genetic contribution, or
intent is determinative of the legal status of motherhood. This is precisely the type of decision that may be necessary if cloning does occur.
More recently, the California Court of Appeal was confronted with
an issue anticipated in the dissenting opinion in Johnson-how to determine parentage when neither of the intended parents contributes biologically or genetically to the creation of a child. 44 In Buzzanca v. Buzzanca,45 a couple entered into a surrogacy arrangement where the
surrogate carried an embryo created with donor egg and donor sperm."
Shortly before the child's birth, the intended father filed for divorce,
claiming no issue of the marriage.47 The intended mother objected, and
filed an action to get temporary child support. The trial court denied her
claim, asserting that since the intended father had no biological connection to the child and the child was not borne to the intended mother, no
support obligation existed. It also found that the intended mother was
not the child's legal mother because of her lack of biologic or genetic
contribution.48 In essence, the trial court found Jaycee Buzzanca, the
child born as a result of the surrogate agreement, to be parentless. On
appeal, however, the intent of the parties was the determinative factor,
and the court held that John and Luanne Buzzanca were Jaycee's legal
parents.49 The court reasoned that, but for their initiating and entering
into the surrogacy arrangement, Jaycee would not have been born.5"
The court in Johnson gave significant Wieight to intent." This approach was reinforced by the court in Buzzanca,s2 which may indicate a
willingness to consider pre-conception intent in other settings. One legal
scholar, Marjorie Shultz, argues that "because parenting involves long-

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Capron,
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id.
See id. at 790 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 282.
See id.
See id. at 282-83. For a detailed discussion of the Buzzanca case, see Alexander Morgan
Too Many Parents,HAsTiNGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 22.
See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293.
Seeid.at291.
See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293.
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term and multi-faceted commitment, personal intention seems a desirable basis for selecting between two biological claimants who are ar-

guably equally situated."53 Shultz points out, "[als in other arenas of
regulatory conpolicy, private ordering need not be absolute; ' particular
be adopted." 4

straints on private ordering might

Some states essentially codified the recognition of intent in collaborative reproduction. The surrogacy law in Virginia, for example,
provides an elaborate scheme for ultimately recognizing parental intent.
The law provides for judicial approval of surrogacy contracts. 5 It also
specifies that in order to be judicially approved, specific issues must be
addressed in the contracts.' 6 Additional requirements for approval include that all parties must have counseling, 7 the surrogate must be married and have had at least one pregnancy and live birth,58 and at least one
of the intended parents is expected to be the child's genetic parent. 9 The
statute clearly lays out what is necessary for a court to approve a surrogacy arrangement and thereby legally recognize the intent of the parties.
The state parentage acts, which were cited in Johnson v. Calvert,
create additional issues with respect to cloning. Every state has presumptions about paternity articulated in specific paternity statutes. 6 Under these legitimacy statutes, "a husband of a woman who bears a child

during marriage or within a certain number of days after termination,
separation, or dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be the father

53. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:An
Opportunityfor GenderNeutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 332. Another legal commentator, also
espousing an intent-based allocation of parenthood, articulates the value of such a private ordering
approach to assigning roles in collaborative reproduction. She explains:
The benefits of private ordering in general, and in the context of collaborative reproduction in particular, are many. Privatization of familial relationships advantages all
members of the family; it protects the best interests of the child and furthers the adults'
autonomy. Allocation of parental status by prebirth agreement clarifies adult-child relationships from the beginning of the child's life. It enables intending parents to exercise parental authority and receive legal recognition of their functional status throughout the course of the child's life. It provides certainty to the child and structure to the
family. Moreover, it ensures that the relationships within families of consent have been
thought out and planned, through negotiation and compromise.
King, supra note 9, at 370.
54. Shultz, supra note 53, at 370.
55. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (Michie 1999).
56. See id. § 20-1600).
57. See id. § 20-160(B)(7), (11).
58. See id. § 20-16003)(6).
59. See id. § 20-160(B)(9).
60. See Lori B. Andrews, Alternative Reproduction, in 2 DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 30.02, at 30-7 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. ed., 5th ed. 1995).
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and has legal responsibilities for... the child."6'
Problems, however, occur when those statutes are applied to clon-

ing. First, an exception to the presumption of paternity for a husband
who is sterile is common in some state statutes. In those states with such
an exception, an infertile husband who wishes to be deemed the legal

father of a clone born to his wife, either using his or her DNA, may not
be able to assert paternity.62
Moreover, a problem arises under these statutes for people wanting
to establish parenthood to a clone gestated by a surrogate. Even when
the statutory presumption of a surrogate's husband's paternity is rebuttable, the statutes governing paternity do not always provide a mechanism for the biological father to assert his paternity. The genesis of paternity statutes was to allow a woman to assert that a particular man was
the father of her child, and to allow her to bring a legal proceeding to
compel that man to provide child support.6 To that end, nearly every
state's paternity statute explicitly permits a mother to bring a paternity
suit.

4

Also, some state statutes even expressly allow an expectant

mother6H or a mother's representative to bring a paternity suit. 6 Fur61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(a) (1992 & Supp. 1998); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25803(A)(1) (1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-104(1) (Michie 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(a)
(West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-160(a) fvest 1995 & Supp. 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 805(a) (Supp.
1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.011 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-43(a)(2) (Supp. 1998);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-6(a) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 7-1110 (1998); 750 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN.
4517(a) (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-4-1(1) (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 600B.8 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1115(a) (Supp. 1998) ("[A]ny person on behalf of
... a child."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.021(l) (Michie Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A, § 1553 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.714(1) (West Supp. 1998); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.57(1)-(3) (West 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9(1) (Supp. 1998); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-107 (1997); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-1411 (Michie 1999); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 126.071 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-A:2 (Supp. 1998); N.Y. FAM. CT.
AcT § 522 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16(1) (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05(1) (1997);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.04(A) (Anderson Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 89(A)
(West Supp. 1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.125 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-2 (1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-952(C)(2) (Law Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-103(a)(1) (1996);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201(a) (West 1996) (requiring a voluntary statement of paternity
executed by alleged biological father); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-2(1)(a) (Supp. 1998); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 302(a) (Supp. 1998) (allowing an action by an alleged "natural parent of the
child"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060(1)(a) (West 1997); w. VA. CODE § 48A-6-1(e)(1)(2) (1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.45(1)(b) (West Supp. 1998); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104(a)
(Michie 1997).
65. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-160(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.011; 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7(a); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-4-1(1); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.125.
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thermore, certain statutes also permit the child,67 a guardian,6" conservator,6 9 or the child's best or next friend7 ° or representative71 to initiate such
an action. 72 Some states also permit particular state authorities and
agencies, or even state officials "such as state public welfare officials
[pursuant to child support enforcement], or housing officials, to bring a
paternity action." 73 An example of a scenario where public officials, on
66. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(c); CAL. FAM.CODE § 7630(c); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-4-107(3); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16(1); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3111.04(A); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-103(a)(1); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.45(1)(c); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104(c).
67. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(a)-(c); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-803(A)(3); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7630(a); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 805(a); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.011; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-43(a)(1); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-6(a); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/7(a); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-4-1(5); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1115(a), (e);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.021(1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1553; MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.714(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57(1)-(3); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9(1); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-107 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.071; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168A:2; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr § 522; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05(1),
10, § 89(A); OR. REV. STAT.
(3); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.04(A); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
§ 109.125; R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-8-2; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-952(C)(1); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.201(a) (conditioning action on a statement of paternity executed by claimed father); UTAH
15, § 302(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
CODE ANN. § 78-45a-2(1)(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
§ 26.26.060(1)(a); W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-1(e)(7); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.45(1)(a); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-104(a), (c).
13, § 805(a); IDAHO
68. See, e.g., AR. REV. STAT. § 25-803(A)(3); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
CODE § 7-1110; IOWA CODE ANN. § 60013.8; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1411; N.Y. FAM. CT.
10, § 89(A); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.125; WASH. REV. CODE
Acr § 522; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
ANN. § 26.26.060(1)(a); W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-1(e)(5); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.45(1)(f).
69. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-803(A)(3); N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 522; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit.
10, § 89(A); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.125.
70. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-803(A)(3); IOwA CODE ANN. § 60013.8; NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 43-1411; W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-1(e)(6).
71. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-17-6(c); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(c); HAw. REv. STAT. § 5846(a); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57(2); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-107; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16(1);
15,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.04(A); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
§ 302(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060(1)(a); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 767.45(1)(e); WyO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104(c).
72. For a discussion of specific states approaches, see Andrews, supra note 60, § 30.02.
73. Id. § 30.02, at 30-9. In fact, most states do have a statutory section allowing the state,
through some agent, to initiate paternity proceedings. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(c); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 25-803(A)(4); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-104(4) (Michie 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7630(c); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107(1)-(3) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN.
13, § 805(a); GA. CODE
STAT. ANN. § 46b-160(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
ANN. § 19-7-43(a)(4) (Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-6(a); IDAHO CODE § 7-1110; 750 ILL.
COmp. STAT. ANN. 4517(a) (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-4-1(6) (West 1999);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 60013.8; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1115(b) (Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
19-A, § 1553 (West 1998); MICH.
§ 406.021(1) (Michie Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.714(1) (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57(2)-(3); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-9-9(1) (Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-107(2); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 43-1411; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-A:2 (Supp. 1998); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 522; N.C. GEN.
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behalf of the state, would bring a paternity suit is when it would be necessary for the state to financially support the child if a father is not
identified and thus compelled to support his child.74
While virtually all states allow a mother and child to bring a pa-

ternity proceeding, "[f]ar fewer states [have] a specific provision for a
man alleging himself to be the biological father to establish his paternity." 75 Although at least nineteen states specifically provide such a
mechanism, 76 in some states, a man raising a claim of fatherhood can do
so only if there is no presumed father.' In states with such a require-

ment, a man who provides the DNA for a clone could possibly bring a
paternity suit if an unmarried surrogate gives birth to his child, but not
when a married surrogate does so. However, the man providing the
sperm may also be able to initiate a paternity action pursuant to a pro-

vision simply providing for actions by the "father," which is common in
at least eight states.78

Also, so called "interested parties" may bring a paternity suit in at

least twelve states, 79 and relatives are allowed to bring a paternity action

§ 89(A); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.125; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-2 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-952(C)(4) (Law Coop. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-103(a)(1) (1996); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201(a) (West
1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-2(1)(a) (Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 302(a); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §26.26.060(1)(a); W. VA. CODE §48A-6-1(e)(3); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.45(1)(g)-(h); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104(c).
74. See Andrews, supra note 60, § 30.02, at 30-9 to -10.
75. Id. § 30.02, at 30-10.
76. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(c); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-104(2) (Michie 1998); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7630(c); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107(3); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 805(a);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.011; HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-6(a); 750 ILL. CONT. STAT. ANN. 45/7(a);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-4-1(2); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.57(2)-(3); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6107(2); N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 522; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05(3); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.04(A); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.125; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-952(C)(5); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 302(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060(1)(a); w. VA. CODE § 48A-6-1(e)(8); Wis.
STAT. ANN.§ 767.45(1)(c)-(d); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104(c).
77. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(c); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107(3); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 742.011; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-107; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05(3); W. VA. CODE
§ 48A-6-1(e)(8); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104(c).
78. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(c); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-803(A)(2); IDAHO CODE § 71110 ("person standing in parental relation"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.714(1); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-107; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 89(A); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201(a).
79. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(b); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(b); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN,
§ 19-4-107(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 805(a); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600B.8 (West 1996); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-107; NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.071 (Michie 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4011-7 (Michie 1978); N.D. CENT.CODE § 14-17-05(2); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-103(a)(1) (1996);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060(I)(a); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104(b).
STAT. § 49-16(2); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05(3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 10,
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in three states. 0 Arguably, the father could bring a paternity action as an
interested party or relative.
However, if a provision allows the "presumed" or "alleged" father
to bring a paternity action, the man who provides the DNA for a clone,
will, in all likelihood, "not be able to use that provision to bring a paternity action if the surrogate changes her mind.""1 Therefore, the man
providing the DNA cannot be the presumed father assuming, of course,
that the statute presumes that a woman's husband is the father of the
child she bears. Nor can that man be the "alleged" father either, since
there is no claim of paternity against him by the surrogate.'
"In establishing paternity, states differ in the type of proof they
statutorily specify as admissible." 83 Blood or genetic tests, for example,
can be used in at least forty-four states and the District of Columbia.' In
the District of Columbia, for example, "[a] conclusive presumption of
paternity shall be created upon a genetic test result and an affidavit from
a laboratory... that indicates a 99% probability that the putative father
is the father of the child and the Division shall enter a judgment finding
the parentage of the child."85 Similarly, a Michigan statute provides that

80. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-43(a)(3) (Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 7-1110; N.Y.
FA . CT. ACT § 522.
81. Andrews, supranote 60, § 30.02, at 30-11.
82. See id.
83. Id. § 30.02, at 30-12.
84. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-12; ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-807(c) (1999); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-10-108 (Michie 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7551 (West Supp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-4-112 (West Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-168 (West Supp. 1998); DEL.
13, § 809(b); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2343 (1987 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN.
CODE ANN. tit.
§ 19-7-45; HAw.REV. STAT. § 584-11 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 7-1116; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
45111 (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-6-1 (West 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600B.41
(vest Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1118(a) (Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 406.091(1) (Michie Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:396 (West Supp. 1999); ME. REV.
19-A, § 1558; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAv § 5-1029(a) (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS
STAT. ANN. tit.
ANN. ch. 209C, § 17 (Vest 1998); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.716(1) (vest Supp. 1998);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.62(1)(a) (vest 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-9-21(1)-(2) (Supp. 1998);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-112; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.121(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:1751(a) (West 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-12(a) (Miehie Supp. 1998); N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT
§ 532 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1(a)-(b) (Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-10(1);
10, § 89.1
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.09(A) (Anderson Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
(1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.250-.267 (1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5104(c) (vest 1991);

R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-8-11(a) (Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-954(A) (Law Co-op. Supp.
1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-112(a) (Supp. 1998); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.102(a) (West
15, § 304(a) (Supp.
1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-7(1)-(4) (Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (Michie 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.100(1), (3)
(vest Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE § 48A-6-3(a) (1998); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 767.48(1)(a) (vest
Supp. 1998); Wyo.STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109(b)-(c).
85. D.C. CODEANN. § 16-2343.1(e).
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"[i]f the probability of paternity ... is 99% or higher... paternity shall
be presumed. 86 In contrast, some states find that there is a rebuttable
presumption of paternity even if a 99% probability is shown under certain circumstances. In Tennessee, for example, if the results of a blood
or genetic test "show a statistical probability that a man is the father of
the child in question by a statistical probability of 99% or greater"87 then
the man can only rebut the presumption that he is the child's father by
proving that he could not be the father by clear and convincing evidence." In Mississippi, there is a "rebuttable presumption, affecting the
burden of proof, of paternity, if the court finds that the probability of
paternity, as calculated by the experts qualified as examiners of genetic
tests, is ninety-eight percent (98%) or greater. This presumption may
only be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence."89
Some tests used to establish paternity are so general (for example,
those tests based on blood type) that a man contributing his nucleic
material to create a clone may be found to have a 98% or 99% probability of being the child's father. Other types of tests are so specific, however, that they would identify a nucleic donor as a twin rather than as a
father of the child. Thus, it is unclear whether an individual seeking to
be considered the parent of a child created with his DNA would be able
to use current legal mechanisms to do so.
There is no uniformity among the states concerning the laws governing sperm donation, egg donation, or surrogacy, and there continues
to be some uncertainty in assigning parentage in disputed arrangements.
The applicability of these laws to cloning will present even more confusion. Cloning through nuclear transfer presents at least thirteen possible parental configurations, ranging from as few as three possible legal
parents to as many as ten. 9°
VII. EXISTING LAWS AND PARENTAGE DETERMINATIONS
IN CLONING

Surrogacy, egg donation, and sperm donation statutes attempt to
address the question of parentage when reproduction occurs with the
assistance of individuals other than, or in addition to, the man and
woman seeking to have the child. Cloning, though, unlike collaborative,

86. MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. § 722.716(5).
87. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-112(b)(2)(C).
88. See id.
89. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-9-27(2) (1994).
90. See Appendix A.
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non-coital reproduction or even traditional sexual reproduction may be
accomplished with as few as one participant.9" One woman could transfer nucleic material from one of her cells to her own enucleated egg cell
and have the resulting "embryo" transferred to her uterus for gestation.
Yet, even in this scenario, parentage issues are raised which existing
laws are ill-equipped to resolve. For example, if this woman sought
child support, her own father and mother may have a legal obligation to
support the child because existing paternity testing would find them to
be the child's genetic parents. Yet, the woman, too, would be presumed
to be the child's mother based on the common law presumption that the
woman who gives birth is the legal mother.' It is unlikely that in this
scenario her maternity would be challenged; however, if it were, the
parentage determination would be complicated. In addition to the legal
confusion even this most simplistic cloning scenario raises, there are
equally baffling psychological and sociological issues raised by the issue of a woman giving birth to her identical twin.
In another possible cloning scenario, cloning may more closely approximate family building in the traditional sense-a man and woman
contribute genetic material to form an embryo which the woman carries
to term-than currently accepted and practiced forms of collaborative
reproduction. For example, consider a husband and wife who have chosen to have a child, but the wife has a genetic disease she does not want
to pass on to her offspring. To avoid this possibility of passing on the
disease, the couple decides to transfer nucleic material from one of the
husband's cells to the wife's enucleated egg cell and then transfer the
resulting embryo to the wife's uterus. Unlike egg donation or traditional
surrogacy, which would accomplish the couple's goal of not passing on
the wife's genetic disease to their offspring, cloning allows the couple
to reproduce using their own genetic material without the contribution
of a third party. In terms of genetics, the husband's parents will also be
the resulting child's parents and in fact, the husband will be the child's
twin.93 If a highly-specific paternity test were to be performed, the husband could have a nearly 100% genetic match with the child. This may
be indicative that he is not the child's father, "because no two people,

91. See Appendix A, example I.
92. See, e.g., Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling
the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1995) (opining that the presumption would establish legal parenthood for a woman who gave birth using a donated egg in the
surrogate context or currently used forms of collaborative reproduction).
93. See Appendix A, example VI.
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other than identical twins, share the same genetic composition." 4 He
may have the intent to be the child's father, and if the child is born during the marriage, he will be presumed to be the child's legal father;
however, if his status is challenged, a paternity test could reveal that he
is the child's identical twin and this may rebut the presumption of paternity.
In some states, "[e]ven if the presumption of [paternity] has been
successfully overcome, a party may be estopped from questioning paternity under certain circumstances ... includ[ing] situations where the
parties involved have, by their conduct, accepted a certain man as the
' This
father of the child in question."95
is yet another way in which the
law currently recognizes intent in the parenting context. This illustrates
that in this cloning situation closely akin to traditional family building,
it is possible that the husband and wife choosing to create a child
through cloning will be recognized as the child's legal parents, so long
as neither of them challenges the other's status.
If a couple creates a child who is the clone of a loved one or an unrelated individual chosen for his or her valued traits, parenting rights
would also be dispersed across individuals. Ifthe wife carried the clone
to term, the couple would be protected by legal presumptions assigning
parenthood to the birth mother and her husband.96 If paternity testing
were done, however, the parents of the cloned individual, and maybe the
cloned individual himself or herself, would be able to assert rights to the
child.
Even a cloning arrangement that closely resembles traditional reproduction as between a husband and wife presents confounding questions not satisfactorily resolved by existing law. The examples discussed are the simplest potential parental configurations possible in
human cloning, yet they raise very profound issues. Existing laws may
not effectuate the desired outcome of cloning arrangements and could
leave many questions unanswered, including who can make childrearing
decisions, who must support the child, who has a right to the child's
earnings, and from whom can the child inherit. This confusion about
family roles and relationships and the uncertainty of current law to ad94. Floralynn Einesman, Vampires Among Us: Does a Grand Jury Subpoena or Blood Violate the Fourth Amendment?, 22 AM. J. CRiM. L. 327, 348 (1995) (discussing the accuracy of deoxyribonucleic acid analysis in criminal investigations).
95. Heather Faust, Comment, Challenging the Paternity of Children Born During Wedlock:
An Analysis of Pennsylvania Law Regarding the Effects of the Doctrines of Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity by Estoppel on the Admissibility of Blood Tests to Determine Paternity,
100 DICK. L. Rv. 963, 964 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
96. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7610-11 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
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dress these issues may present serious psychological, sociological, and
legal risks for all parties involved in a cloning arrangement.
The matters become even more complicated when a man decides to
clone himself by having his DNA fused with a donor egg and gestated
by a surrogate. His parents might be viewed as the legal parents of the
resulting child. In most states, the egg donor could assert a parental
right. In addition, the surrogate generally would have a claim to the
child. This could occur either under existing paternity statutes that indicate that the woman who gives birth to the child is the legal mother, or
in Arizona and Utah, where a gestational surrogate and her husband are
considered to be the legal parents. 7 Only in Florida, New Hampshire,
and Virginia would an "intended" parent, in this case the man cloning
himself, possibly have a superior claim to that of the surrogate.98 However, these statutes would not help the man if he were not married.
There are two other likely scenarios in which a surrogate would
participate in the cloning situation." One scenario would involve an infertile couple who want to have a genetically related child. The wife,
having had a hysterectomy, cannot carry a child but can still produce
eggs. If her husband is sterile, they may decide to fuse her egg cells with
his nucleic material and have the resulting embryo gestated by a surrogate. In a second scenario, the wife has had a hysterectomy and
oophorectomy, and so the gestator also contributes the egg cell which is
fused with the husband's nucleus.
The first situation resembles gestational surrogacy since the surrogate is not contributing any genetic material. As such, the laws in Florida, New Hampshire, and Virginia would likely recognize the intended
parents as the child's legal parents."° Although a DNA test would result
in a greater than a 95% "match" with the intended father, courts might
view the test results as indicating twinning, not parenthood.'0 ' And since
97. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a)
(1995).
98. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16(6)-(7) (West Supp. 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 168-B:23(IV) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(D) (Michie 1995).
99. A third, but unlikely scenario is possible, which would occur when the egg cell of the
intended mother is fused with the nucleic material of the gestator.
100. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16(6)-(7); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23(IV); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-158(D). The law in Nevada is not applicable, though, because it specifically
states that the egg and sperm must be from the intended parents. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 126.045(4)(a) (Michie 1993). In this scenario, there is no sperm contributed by the intended father.
101. A blood test could reveal that the intended father is the twin brother of the child. In a
typical paternity case, of the 40 bands in the two deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") fingerprints of
the child, approximately 17 will be maternal bands, 17 will be paternal bands, and six to eight
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the intended mother is only contributing mitochondrial DNA, she would
not be a greater than 95% match.
Furthermore, the statutes in Arizona, North Dakota, and Utah
would provide that the surrogate and her husband are the child's legal
° Based
parents.'O
on a 1994 Arizona Court of Appeals decision, though,
this presumption of maternity under the Arizona law is rebuttable. In
Soos v. Superior Court, °3 a married couple entered into a gestational
surrogacy contract.)° While the surrogate was pregnant, the wife filed
for dissolution of marriage and sought joint custody of the unborn children. The husband asserted in response that under the existing statute,
he was the biological father and the surrogate was the legal mother. As
such, he claimed that the wife lacked standing to petition for custody.
When the triplets were born, the husband was named as the father and
took custody. The wife subsequently challenged the constitutionality of
the applicable statute.' °5 The court found the statute unconstitutional and
held that "[b]y affording the Father a procedure for proving paternity,
but not affording the Mother any means by which to prove maternity,
the State has denied her equal protection of the laws."' 6 Therefore, in
Arizona, although there is a presumption of maternity in favor of the
surrogate, this presumption is rebuttable.
In the second scenario, which resembles traditional surrogacy because the egg of the gestator is utilized, Arizona, North Dakota, and
Utah have statutes that would recognize the surrogate and her husband,
if she is married, as the child's legal parents.' ° Arkansas's statute would
be inapplicable because it specifically refers to the surrogate as having
been artificially inseminated.'0 ' It would seem unlikely that the term
"inseminated" would include the process of nuclear transfer. Similarly,
the law of New Hampshire, which requires one of the intended parents
to be a gamete provider,' 9 gamete being defined as ovum or spermatobands will be a combination of those shared by the mother, child and/or alleged father. For a
complete discussion of DNA testing and paternity, see Kamrin T. MacKnight, ScientificAspects of
DNA Testing, in DISPUTED PATERNrrY PROCEEDINGS §§ 13.01-13.08 (Nina M. Vitek ed., 5th ed.

1997).
102. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-8-05 (1997); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a).
103. 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
104. See id. at 1357.
105. See id. at 1358.
106. 1&tat 1361.
107. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a).
108. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)-(c) (Michie 1998).
109. See N.H. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17flI) (1994).
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zoa,110 would also be inapplicable. However, the laws of Florida and
Virginia1would both find that the intended parents are the child's legal
parents." 1
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The examples discussed reflect the difficulty of applying existing
law to this new and unprecedented technology. Other assisted reproductive technologies also were not amenable to existing law but, over time,
statutes addressing the unique issues raised by such practices have been
and continue to be enacted. However, as is seen by the dearth of surrogacy and egg donation statutes, the law does not keep pace with the
technological developments. And given the widespread opposition to
cloning complete individuals, it will be unlikely that legislators will
rush to develop paternity, maternity, or "clonerity" statutes for this new
realm, which may be considered to be a tacit acceptance of the procedure.
The issue of parentage in the context of cloning raises a much
broader question-how should "family" be defined? This exemplifies
the complexity of the questions raised by cloning which touch on every
personal and social construct-physical and mental health, religion,
ethics, culture, philosophy, and law to name a few. Resolution of such
value-laden questions will require continued debate, an attempt to reach
consensus, and a little societal soul searching.

110. Seeid. § 168-B:1(IV).
111. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16(7) (West Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(D)
(Michie 1995).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6
[Vol. 27:533

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

APPENDIX A
PoTmnAL PARENTAL CONFIGURATIONS IN HuMAN CLONING

CONTRIBUTORS

POTENTIAL PARENTS
Mother
Mother's Mother
Mother's Father
Mother's Husband]

I Intended Mother's Egg
Intended Mother's Nucleus
Intended Mother as Carrier

1.
2.
3.
[4.

Intended
Intended
Intended
Intended

II Donor's Egg
Intended Mother's Nucleus
Intended Mother as Carrier

1.
2.
3.
4.
[5.

Egg Donor
Intended Mother
Intended Mother's Mother
Intended Mother's Father
Intended Mother's Husband]

III Donor's Egg
Intended Father's Nucleus
Intended Mother as Carrier

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Egg Donor
Intended Father
Intended Father's Mother
Intended Father's Father
Intended Mother

IV Intended Mother's Egg
Intended Father's Nucleus
Gestational Carrier

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
[6.

Intended Mother
Intended Father
Intended Father's Mother
Intended Father's Father
Gestational Carrier
Gestational Carrier's Husband]

V Donor's Egg
Intended Mother's or Intended
Father's Nucleus
Gestational Carrier

VI Intended Mother's Egg
Intended Father's Nucleus
Intended Mother as Carrier
VII Donor's Egg
Intended Mother's or Intended
Father's Nucleus
Donor as Carrier

VIII Donor A's Egg
Donor B's Nucleus

1. Egg Donor
2. Intended Mother or Intended Father
3. Intended Mother's or Intended
Father's Mother
4. Intended Mother's or Intended
Father's Father
[5. Intended Mother's or Intended
Father's Spouse]
6. Gestational Carrier
[7. Gestational Carrier's Husband]
1.
2.
3.
4.

Intended
Intended
Intended
Intended

Mother
Father
Father's Mother
Father's Father

1.
[2.
3.
4.

Egg Donor/Carrier
Carrier's Husband]
Intended Mother or Intended Father
Intended Mother's or Intended
Father's Mother
5. Intended Mother's or Intended
Father's Father
[6. Intended Mother's or Intended
Father's Spouse]
1. Egg Donor
2. Nucleus Donor
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Intended Mother as Carrier

3.
4.
5.
[6.

Nucleus Donor's Mother
Nucleus Donor's Father
Intended Mother
Intended Father]

IX Donor A's Egg
Donor B's Nucleus
Gestational Carrier

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
[6.
7.
[8.

Egg Donor
Nucleus Donor
Nucleus Donor's Mother
Nucleus Donor's Father
Gestational Carrier
Gestational Carrier's Husband]
Intended Mother
Intended Father]

X Donor A's Egg
Donor A's Nucleus
Gestational Carrier

1.
2.
3.
4.
[5.
[6.
[7.

Donor A
Donor A's Mother
Donor A's Father
Gestational Carrier
Gestational Carrier's Husband]
Intended Mother]
Intended Father]

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
[8.
[9.
[10.

Donor A
Donor B
Donor B's egg donor
Donor B's sperm donor
Donor B's Legal Mother
Donor B's Legal Father
Gestational Carrier
Gestational Carrier's Husband]
Intended Mother]
Intended Father]

XI Donor A's Egg
Donor B's Nucleus
(Donor born thr egg and sperm
donation)
Gestational Carrier

XII Intended Mother's Egg
Donor Nucleus (from the child of
the Intended Mother and the
Intended Father)
Intended Mother as Carrier
XII Intended Mother's Egg
Donor's Nucleus
Donor as Carrier

1. Intended Mother
2. Nucleus Donor
3. Intended Father

1.
2.
3.
4.
[5.

Intended Mother
Nucleus Donor
Nucleus Donor's Mother
Nucleus Donor's Father
Nucleus Donor's Spouse]
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